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Inequitable Enforcement:
Introducing the Concept of Equity into
Constitutional Review of Law Enforcement
HADAR AVIRAM* AND DANIEL

L. PORTMAN**

This Article addresses a series of situations in which the exercise of police discretion,
while passing current constitutional thresholds, seems unfair and unforeseeable. We
call this problem "inequitable enforcement." Current constitutional review of police
action assesses all stops, searches, and arrests-regardlessof how minor the offenseby focusing on the officer's level of suspicion and the officer's compliance with equal
protection standards. In this Article, we argue that these existing constitutional
mechanisms are flawed and fail to provide an appropriateremedy in cases of arbitrary
and disproportionateenforcement for minor infractions. We begin by discussing the
necessity of police discretion and the factors that guide officers in exercising it. After
tracing the recent development of Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment law in the
context of police discretion, we explain why these constitutional protections are
inadequate for addressing the problem of inequitable enforcement. This inadequacy,
we argue, is a result of the narrow and myopic lens through which the Supreme Court
assesses reasonableness in its Fourth Amendment analysis, and discrimination in its
Equal Protection analysis. We then suggest a set of considerations for assessing
inequitability and present some ways in which those considerations can be integrated
into constitutional doctrine. We conclude by discussing the promises and pitfalls of
addressing inequitable enforcement through constitutional review.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine driving on a fifty-five-miles-per-hour highway at sixty miles
per hour. Suddenly, you hear the sound of sirens and are ordered, by
bullhorn, to pull over to the curb. As the police officer approaches you,
you feel a certain degree of indignation. Admittedly, you have slightly
exceeded the legal speed limit, but you wonder why you are being
stopped for such a minor infraction. Perhaps you belong to a minority
group, or have been otherwise targeted by the police before because of
how you look or what you wear. You are therefore bitter, but not
surprised, at this display of police power. Or perhaps you have other
reasons to suspect that this stop is merely a pretext for the officer to run
your license plate, or to glance into the passenger compartment in search
of contraband. Alternatively, you might be perplexed at having been
stopped; you have lived your life relying on an informal, though widely
recognized gap between the dry provisions of criminal law and actual
enforcement policies. Like everyone else, regardless of your
sociodemographic identity or previous experiences with the police, you
live in a reality of scarce law enforcement resources, and do not expect to
be apprehended, stopped, or otherwise confronted with the police unless
your violation of the law is significantly more serious than a minor
violation.
This Article is an attempt to analyze the legal and extra-legal
aspects of such situations, and to examine whether they are properly
addressed in constitutional doctrine. Our main argument is that current
constitutional case law fails to perceive and address various failures of
police discretion, that which we call "inequitable enforcement."
Our working definition of "inequitable enforcement" is law
enforcement activity which, despite satisfying constitutional review,
violates notions of fairness, proportionality, and proper resource
allocation. We include in this category arrests and thorough searches for
minor infractions, as well as enforcement activity in excess of regular
police practices or publicly known policies. We have chosen to refer to
these failures as "equity failures" for a number of reasons. First, we want
to convey the idea that there are various instances of police activity that
have been left outside of the legal and constitutional realm, despite
possible critiques on the basis of fairness, proportion, and resource
allocation. In this sense, at present, these instances are offenses against
equity rather than against law. Second, inequitability is not synonymous
with inequality. The concept of equity (and, as a corollary, the concept of
inequity) has been imbued with a rich tapestry of meaning.' Although

x. See Darien Shanske, Note, Four Theses: Preliminary to an Appeal to Equity, 57 STAN. L. REV.
Professor Shanske's piece examines the original Aristotelian meaning of equity and
observes that its introduction into western philosophy has imbued the concept of equity with other
2053 (2005).
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inequitability has meant the arbitrary, unequal application of law to
different people, it has also referred to other aspects of unfairness.
Third, these abundant meanings of inequity underlie our central point:
advocating for a multivariate, broad approach when assessing exercise of
discretion in law enforcement.
Numerous bodies of scholarship have addressed failures and flaws in
the exercise of police discretion. For example, much scholarly attention
has focused on the issue of racial profiling in arrests, emphasizing the
arbitrariness and discrimination of law enforcement.3 Others have
focused on the issue of pretextual arrests and stops and their
justifications. 4 Recently, Margaret Raymond tackled the issue of
proportionate enforcement in her work on "penumbral crimes":
behaviors that technically constitute lawbreaking but in fact are very
close to law-abiding behavior (for example, driving slightly above the
speed limit) and therefore are often unenforced.s Finally, there is a body
of literature building on police and prosecutorial discretion, examining
empirically how it is exercised. 6 Some argue for broad discretion while
others problematize it;' some argue that underenforcement, as well as
overenforcement, can contribute to social inequalities.8 The novelty of
our argument is that we see these separate issues as different facets of the
same problem-namely, the boundaries of law in understanding police

meanings as well. See id. at 2054-56.
2. For example, the failure to use discretion, id. at 2070-71, a failure to match justice to the
particular circumstances of the case, id. at 2073, or undue harshness in applying the law, id. at 2074.
3. The discussion regarding racial profiling-to which we return in Part III for our equal
protection argument-has developed around two main hinges: constitutional fairness and actual
evaluation of efficiency. For more on this, see BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING,
POLICING, AND PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE 195 (2007).

These hinges echo the tension between

efficiency and fairness highlighted in Herbert Packer's two models, which will be discussed below. See
HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968): infra Part II.
4. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, O.J Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth
Amendment, I14 HARv. L. REV. 842, 871-74 (2001); Scott E. Sundby, An Ode to Probable Cause: A
Brief Response to ProfessorsAmar and Slobogin, 72 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 1133 (1998).
5. Margaret Raymond, Penumbral Crimes, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1395, 1397-1417 (2002).

Raymond identifies some of the problems that go unnoticed when the concept of inequity zooms in
only on the discrimination/racism aspect, but her approach differs from ours in that she focuses on the
implications of identifying "penumbral crimes" to the articulation of criminal offenses in substantive
criminal law, rather than on the constitutional implications for law enforcement. See id.
6. See, e.g., Joseph Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the CriminalProcess: Law-Visiting
Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543 (1960). For a thorough analysis of police
literature on discretion, see WESLEY G. SKOGAN & KATHLEEN FRYDL, FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS IN
POLICING: THE EVIDENCE 57-78 (2004). For a classic study of the impact of police officers' personalities
on their discretionary choices, see WILLIAM KER MUIR, JR., POLICE: STREETCORNER POLITICIANS (1977).

Goldstein, supra note 6 at586-88.
7. See, e.g.,
8. See, e.g.,
Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1748-52 (2006)

(emphasizing the impact of underenforcement on creating sanctuaries in low-income neighborhoods,
which contribute further to stagnation of these areas of the city).
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discretion-and examine the promise, as well as the pitfalls, of a more
nuanced approach to the situation.
Contemporary criticisms of police discretion within a constitutional
framework have focused primarily on two areas. Fourth Amendment
litigation has gradually moved away from examining compliance with the
warrant requirement to an examination of the level of suspicion
required for police action (measured by probable cause or reasonable
suspicion) and its correspondence to the amount of intrusion into a
citizen's privacy. 0 Equal Protection litigation is mostly concerned with
the uneven application of enforcement measures to different types of
people and the extent to which such differences in enforcement are
justified by citizen qualification (less so if the classification generates a
constitutionally recognized "suspect class"). While these two measures of
discretion-suspicion and discrimination- are important, we wish to
problematize the reliance on them as the be-all and end-all of police
performance assessment by the Court for three reasons. First, as is the
case with many constitutional concepts and tests, measures of suspicion
and discrimination are plagued by vague and nebulous standards."
Second, the constitutionally accepted tests for both suspicion and
discrimination require the courts to engage in guesswork as to the
officer's true agenda and underlying narratives, a path we consider
particularly unfruitful in light of the police organizational culture. 2
Finally, as stated above, the Court's emphasis of these aspects precludes
it from developing other measures for assessing, supervising, and
improving police discretion. Ironically, the constitutional focus on
suspicion and discrimination may have decreased the overall fairness of
law enforcement by generating incentives for disproportionate and
arbitrary enforcement.
Part I of this Article begins by emphasizing the importance of police
discretion in the overall criminal process, and provides an overview of
factors impacting police discretion in search, arrest, and other activities.
As we show, multiple factors, beyond level of suspicion, are part of
everyday decisions to invoke the law against citizens.

9. See infra Part II.

io. This idea was best expressed by Justice Warren in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, TO (1967) ("[I]n
dealing with the rapidly unfolding and often dangerous situations on city streets the police are in need
of an escalating set of flexible responses, graduated in relation to the amount of information they
possess."). This is a concept of a "sliding scale" of intrusiveness in police reactions, which corresponds
to a sliding scale in the level of suspicion.
ii. For critiques of these nebulous concepts, and particularly of the difficulties in distinguishing
the different levels of suspicion, see Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment,
58 MINN. L. Ray. 349 (1974); Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21
AM. Clus. L. REv. 257 (1984)12. This will be discussed primarily in the context of the Equal Protection doctrine and the
difficulties in proving racial motives.
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In Part II we examine the existing constitutional constraints on
police discretion, focusing on suspicion and discrimination. We begin by
tracing the genealogy of the Fourth Amendment "reasonableness
requirement," demonstrating its limitations as an effective measure of
discretion, as well as its impact on the rise in pretextual stops and arrests.
We demonstrate the problems with the "reasonableness" approach
through the Robinson3 -Whren"'-Atwater line of cases, and with the
more recent Virginia v. Moore.'6 We continue by examining the
effectiveness of the Equal Protection Clause, critiquing its inability to
address underlying narratives and hidden intentions. The Part concludes
with some thoughts on the prospect for remedies under common
circumstances (suppression of evidence, possibility of dropping charges,
or damages under a § 1983 lawsuit).
Part III offers an alternative path for reviewing exercise of police
discretion. We propose a multivariate matrix of considerations for
assessing the amount of inequitability. The criteria include the type of
law broken, the extent to which the public is aware of its enforcement
policy, the public consensus as to the meaning and morality of the lawbreaking incident in question, the intensity of police reaction to the
violation, and other circumstances, such as the sociodemographic
characteristics of the situation. We proceed by offering some ways in
which these considerations can be incorporated into Fourth Amendment
analysis and used to modify Equal Protection litigation.
Part IV concludes our discussion by exploring the positive and
negative implications of introducing the concept of equity into
constitutional analysis. Among other issues, we explore the impact of
such a move on the foreseeability of police actions, on the transparency
of police regulations and enforcement policies, and on deterrence;
whether a potential, legal "slippery slope" might stem from an
understanding that unenforced behaviors are de facto decriminalized.
Finally, we discuss the impact of equity on notions of fairness and due
process.
Before providing background, an important caveat should be
mentioned: This Article can be read in two ways. Doctrinally, this is an
attempt to expand constitutional discourse so as to include inequitable
enforcement in the "family" of constitutional violations, generating
possible grounds for evidence suppression or acquittal, as well as grounds
for constitutional-right infringement suits under § 1983. As will become
clear throughout the Article, this solution for the shortcomings of
constitutional doctrine, while novel and creative, create a variety of
13. 414 U.S. 218 (i973).
517 U.S. 8o6 (1996).
15. 532 U.S. 318 (200l).

'4.

r6. 128 S. Ct. 1598 (2008).
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problems in interpretation and implementation and, given recent
Supreme Court Fourth Amendment decisions," may not be politically
viable. There is, therefore, a second and more critical way to approach
our argument. Namely, our concept of inequitable enforcement should
be seen not as a pragmatic, proposed solution, but as a means to critique
and problematize the existing controls on law enforcement, and as a plea
for greater sensitivity to fairness and sound judgment.

I.
A. WHY REVIEW

DISCRETION IN POLICE ACTIVITIES

OF POLICE DISCRETION

IS IMPORTANT

All law enforcement agencies exercise a certain amount of
discretion in fulfilling their duties.' 8 As many classic studies of the
criminal justice system note, discretion plays an important role in case
management," plea bargaining, 0 sentencing,"' and release decisions; it is
particularly necessary to regulate high caseloads and alleviate pressure
from the system.2 3 However, there is a delicate balance between the type
and amount of discretion exercised by different governmental parties.
The amount of discretion exercised in earlier stages of the process by the
police and the prosecution, as opposed to later discretion by the courts,
depends on the constitutional and statutory limitations on these actors'
22

freedom to shape their policies and workdays. 24 This balance is well

17. Our pessimism stems primarily from Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695 (2009), which
expanded the scope of the good faith doctrine; while Herring itself should probably not be interpreted
as the death blow to the exclusionary rule, when seen broadly, in the context of decisions such as
Moore, 128 S. Ct. at 1598-which we discuss in greater detail below-it can be said to undermine the
importance of regulations and affirm a belief in unguided police discretion.
I8. This discretion is essential for the screening action which occurs at every step of the process,
diverting cases out of the system. For a good visual depiction of this "screening out" process, see U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM FLOWCHART,

available at

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cjsflowco.pdf.
£9. For analyses of prosecutorial discretion, see KEITH HAWKINS, LAW AS LAST RESORT:
PROSECUTION DECISION-MAKING IN A REGULATORY AGENCY (2003); JOHN L. WORALL & M. ELAINE
NUGENT-BORAKOVE, THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR (2oo8); Lisa Frohmann,
Convictability and Discordant Locales: Reproducing Race, Class, and Gender Ideologies in
ProsecutorialDecisionmaking, 31 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 531 (1997); and Goldstein, supra note 6.

20. For an analysis of defense attorney discretion, see Debra S. Emmelman, Trial by Plea
Bargain:Case Settlement as a Product of Recursive Decisionmaking, 3o LAW & Soc'Y REV. 335 (1996).

21. This is particularly interesting in the context of determinate sentencing. See Shawn D.
Bushway & Anne Morrison Piehl, Judging Judicial Discretion: Legal Factors and Racial
Discrimination in Sentencing, 35 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 733 (2001).
22. See Mona Lynch, Waste Managers? The New Penology, Crime Fighting, and Parole Agent
Identity, 32 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 839, 841 (1998).
23. There is at least a perception that informality is essential for these purposes. See MALCOLM M.
FEELEY, THE PROCESS

Is

THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING

CASES

IN LOWER

COURTS

417-I8

(1979).

24. For example, as determinate sentencing developed to decrease judicial discretion, the burden
of discretion shifted to the shoulders of prosecutors. See KATE SrrH & JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF
JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTs 78-lo3 (1998).
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illustrated in Herbert Packer's classic book The Limits of the Criminal
Sanction."
In his book, Packer provides two "ideal type" models of the criminal
process: the crime control model and the due process model2. Under the
crime control model, the system's first and foremost objective is
achieving efficiency through an early determination of guilt by law
enforcement agents, so that only cases for which we can say there is a
"presumption of guilt" get to court." Unlike the "presumption of
innocence," the "presumption of guilt" is not a normative legal term; it is
merely a statistical observation that a given defendant is likely guilty if
she has been screened by the early stages of the criminal process and her
case has not been dismissed." The crime control model entails a
substantial degree of respect for and deference to the police and the
prosecution." While courts, and the adversarial process in general, are
laden with technicalities and hurdles that make the process cumbersome
and expensive, agencies whose mission it is to investigate guilt are the
best placed to examine the facts and to get rid of difficult, dubious cases
before they clog the court system. 0
25. See PACKER, supra note 3.

26. Neither of the two models is designed to provide a realistic description of the criminal justice
system. As Packer explains, they are merely "ideal types," which provide two ends of a spectrum along
which one might locate a specific system or track transitions in its adherence to certain principles. Id.
at 153-54. It is important to keep in mind that Packer's book was written in 1968, based on a piece
published in 1964, at the height of the Warren Court's involvement in constitutionalizing criminal
procedure; Packer used this model to demonstrate how constitutional incorporation encouraged a
move from crime control to due process. For more background on these choices, see generally Kent
Roach, Four Models of the CriminalProcess, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 671 (1999).
27. See PACKER, supra note 3, at 16o.

The presumption of guilt is what makes it possible for the system to deal efficiently with
large numbers, as the Crime Control Model demands. The supposition is that the screening
processes operated by police and prosecutors are reliable indicators of probable guilt. Once
a man has been arrested and investigated without being found to be probably innocent, or,
to put it differently, once a determination has been made that there is enough evidence of
guilt to permit holding him for further action, then all subsequent activity directed toward
him is based on the view that he is probably guilty. The precise point at which this occurs
will vary from case to case; in many cases it will occur as soon as the suspect is arrested, or
even before, if the evidence of probable guilt that has come to the attention of the
authorities is sufficiently strong. But in any case the presumption of guilt will begin to
operate well before the "suspect" becomes a "defendant."
Id.
28. Id. at 16o-62.
29. Id. at 187.
30. See id. at 162.

In the presumption of guilt this model finds a factual predicate for the position that the
dominant goal of repressing crime can be achieved through highly summary processes
without any great loss of efficiency (as previously defined), because of the probability that,
in the run of cases, the preliminary screening processes operated by the police and the
prosecuting officials contain adequate guarantees of reliable fact-finding. Indeed, the model
takes an even stronger position. It is that subsequent processes, particularly those of a

December 2009]

INEQUITABLE ENFORCEMENT

421

By contrast, the due process model's main goal is preserving
accuracy and avoiding the conviction of the innocent.? As opposed to the
crime control model's "assembly line" nature," due process can be
captured by a metaphor of meticulous quality control." This model sees
the constitutional rights of defendants not as hurdles to an efficient
process, but as necessary guarantees that the question of guilt will be
carefully examined in a neutral, unbiased environment-that of the
court.34 The police and the prosecution are seen as biased entities that
have vested organizational and functional interests in apprehending
suspects and bringing them to trial." The due process model therefore
emphasizes the normative presumption of innocence and the dangers of
providing the police and the prosecution with ample roles in the criminal
justice system.
Since their creation, Packer's models have received a great degree
of criticism from scholars. 6 Some scholars have added models to Packer's
existing two, particularly models involving victims and victim advocates.37
More related to our purposes, some scholars argue that, while the due
process model relates largely to doctrinal, normative mandates, the crime
control model is by nature a pragmatic description of the everyday
management of law enforcement, a reality recognized by the Warren

formal adjudicatory nature, are unlikely to produce as reliable fact-finding as the expert
administrative process that precedes them is capable of. The criminal process thus must put
special weight on the quality of administrative fact-finding. It becomes important, then, to
place as few restrictions as possible on the character of the administrative fact-finding
processes and to limit restrictions to such as enhance reliability, excluding those designed
for other purposes.
Id. This systemic reliance on administrative processes is confirmed by empirical evidence pointing to
the large amounts of discretion exercised daily by police officers. This was noticed by police scholars
during the Warren Court era. See, e.g., JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WrrHoUT TRIAL: LAW
ENFORCEMENT INDEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 12-15, 71-90 (1966); see also SKOGAN & FRYDL, supra note 6, at
74.
31. PACKER, supra note 3, at 165.
32. Id. at '59.
33. Id. at 165.
34. Id. at 152-54.
35. See id. at 163.

The Crime Control Model, as we have suggested, places heavy reliance on the ability of
investigative and prosecutorial officers, acting in an informal setting in which their
distinctive skills are given full sway, to elicit and reconstruct a tolerably accurate account of
what actually took place in an alleged criminal event. The Due Process Model rejects this
premise and substitutes for it a view of informal, nonadjudicative fact-finding that stresses
the possibility of error.
Id.
36. Leslie Sebba, Herbert Packer's Models of Criminal Justice in Historical Perspective (May
2006) (unpublished paper presented at New Directions in Criminal Courtroom Research, Tel Aviv

University), availableat www.tau.ac.il/law/events/i6- 17-o5-o7/conferenceprogram.doc.
37. See, e.g., Douglas Evan Beloof, The Third Model of Criminal Process: The Victim
ParticipationModel, 1999~UTAHI L. REV. 289; Roach, supra note 26.

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

422

[Vol. 61:413

Court in its formative years. 8 In any case, if Packer's intent was to
delineate the transition from crime control to due process in the era of
the Warren Court, it is widely acknowledged that the post-Warren
Courts, whose composition changed through President Nixon's
appointees,3 9 have led to a pendulum swing toward crime control,
manifesting itself in four main themes.4 oFirst, the post-Warren Court has
emphasized that the ultimate mission of the criminal justice system is to
convict the guilty and to let the innocent go free.41 Rather than creating
bright-line rules, it placed more emphasis on the defendant's actual
guilt-a practical application of Packer's "presumption of guilt.""
Second, the Court shifted from relying on clear standards of action to
allowing an assessment of police activities under a "totality of the
circumstances" test.43 Third, the post-Warren Court expressed more
reliance on, and more deference to, police discretion." A recurring
theme in its decisions is the acknowledgment that the police act in good
faith and that their decisions are made under difficult conditions.45
Finally, the Court's former tendency to intervene on appeal on behalf of
the defendant, particularly in collateral attacks, has greatly diminished,
especially with respect to proceedings before state courts.6
For our purposes, these main characteristics of the post-Warren
Court closely correlate with an important feature of the crime control

38. See Malcolm M. Feeley, Two Models of the Criminal Justice System: An Organizational
Perspective, 7 LAW & Soc'y REV. 407, 422 (1973); see also SKOGAN & FRYDL, supra note 6; SKOLNICK,
supra note 30, at 9-15, 182-83.
39. Chief Justice Burger was appointed in 1969, Justice Blackmun was appointed in 1970, and

Justices Powell and Rehnquist were appointed in 1972.
40. See, e.g., CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN,
ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS 9-10 (5th ed. 2oo8).

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. AN

41. Id. at 4.

42. Id. Perhaps the best example of this is the erosion of the Miranda warning to the status of a
"stepchild" in the constitutional family of rights, held by Justices to be a prophylactic, albeit one with
constitutional status. See United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 63o, 634 (2004); Dickerson v. United States,
530 U.S. 428, 432 (2ooo); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 300 (1985); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S.

649, 655-56 (1984); New Jersey v. Portash, 44o U.S. 450, 459-6o (1979); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S.
433, 452 (1974).

43. WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 40, at 5. This transition is notable in the shift from

defining probable cause as two "prongs"-veracity and basis of knowledge, see Spinelli v. United
States, 393 U.S. 410, 412-13 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. io8, 113-14 (1964), to examining it in
light of the "totality of the circumstances," see Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 252 (1983).
44. WHITEBREAD & SLosooIN, supra note 40, at 5.
45. See id. at 6-7; see also, e.g., Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 702-04 (2oo9) (giving the

police leeway when relying on their own mistakes, as long as they are merely "negligent," rather than
"reckless" or "intentional"); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920-21 (1984).
46. See WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 40, at 7-8. The narrowing of the door on habeas
corpus is particularly important. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 360 (1989). Actual innocence-a
situation in which the "presumption of guilt" fails-may still be litigated through collateral attack,
though many procedural hurdles exist for the defendant. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496
(1986); Jackson v.Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 320-21 (x979).
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model: an increasing reliance on the earlier steps in the criminal process
and, in particular, broad deference to police discretion. The tendency to
provide the police with vague, catchall provisions illustrates the Court's
belief in the experience and common sense of police officers in the field,
rather than in the ability to review their decisionmaking process in
hindsight, in the sterile world of the courts.47
The police therefore exercise a great degree of discretion in their
daily decisions, and the courts are well aware of this.48 Moreover, the
courts do not merely acknowledge police discretion as a "necessary evil,"
but see it as a desirable feature of law enforcement professionalism.49
Indeed, courts have good reasons-both normative and organizationalto support the exercise of police discretion. As to the former, no web of
bright-line rules will ever cover one hundred percent of all situations in
which police officers may find themselves, and the system has a vested
interest in assuring not only their resourcefulness, but also their safety. 0
Considering organizational variables, broad police discretion to discard
potential cases early in the process is an efficient way to control
expensive, time-consuming caseloads. This factor is especially true in
light of the American legal system's reliance on more or less determinate
sentencing structures, which tie the court's hands at later stages of the
process and therefore necessitate shifting discretion to other agencies.5

B.

FACTORS IMPACTING POLICE DISCRETION

Since police discretion is not simply acknowledged, but expected
and encouraged, it becomes important to examine how this discretion is

exercised. Joseph Goldstein's classic analysis of the realities of selective
47. Chief Justice Warren's opinion in Terry v. Ohio, decided at the height of the due process
revolution, is an excellent example of the Court's awareness of the realities of police discretion. See
392 U.S. i, 10 (1967) ("[I]t is frequently argued that in dealing with the rapidly unfolding and often
dangerous situations on city streets the police are in need of an escalating set of flexible responses,
graduated in relation to the amount of information they possess.").
48. See id.
49. See id. at 13.

Street encounters between citizens and police officers are incredibly rich in diversity. They
range from wholly friendly exchanges of pleasantries or mutually useful information to
hostile confrontations of armed men involving arrests, or injuries, or loss of life. Moreover,
hostile confrontations are not all of a piece. Some of them begin in a friendly enough
manner, only to take a different turn upon the injection of some unexpected element into
the conversation.
Id.
50. A good example of this is the emergence of the "protective sweep" of houses, see Maryland v.
Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 337 (1995), and cars, see Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049-50 (1983), which

are aimed at police safety and relies on an assessment of discretion regarding "reasonable suspicion."
The suspicion needs to be articulable, but its nature is not proscribed. Terry, 392 U.S. at 26.
51. See sTITH & CABRANEs, supra note 24. The reliance on guidelines as a limiting factor persists
even after the loss of their mandatory power in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 259 (2005). See
Rita v. United States, 55 U.S. 338, 347 (2007).
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law enforcement points to the impossibility of formally pursuing every
legal infraction." As Goldstein argues, police discretionary decisions, as
opposed to prosecutorial and judicial discretionary decisions, have a
remarkably low public profile." This is particularly true of decisions to
discard cases, which are often, by their nature, absent from police
records.5 4 Moreover, the reasons for forgoing full enforcement are
complex and diverse and include, among others, the cultivation of
informers," a lack of interest on the part of the victim in pursuing a
complaint," and police activity designed only to harass and curb criminal
activity rather than to uncover specific incidents." More recent research
on police decisions to arrest points to a set of pragmatic considerations,
including the technical hassles of hauling arrestees to the station, which
might lead the police to forego an arrest." In addition to organizational
pressures, ethnographic work on the police indicates that the individual
officer's personality and worldview have a significant impact on his or
her willingness to pursue a matter officially." Another important detail is
the distinction between a single officer's on-the-spot decision whether or
not to detain, arrest, or search, and a police department's guidelines and
internal regulations on how to proceed with a certain category of cases.
Most police departments have detailed guidelines for police work;" some
departments make them easily accessible to the public.
The rich set of considerations identified by empirical studies on
police work brings up an important group of questions for lawyers and

52. See Goldstein, supra note 6.

53. Id. at 543.
54. Id. at 546-47.
55. Id. at 565-66.

56. Id. at 574; see also Beloof, supra note 37, at 306.
57. Using such informal methods is well documented in police literature. See SKOGAN
supra note 6, at 68-69.
58. EDITH LINN, ARREST DECISIONS: WHAT WORKS FOR THE OFFICER? 74-83 (2oo8).

& FRYDL,

59. MUIR, supra note 6.
60. SKOGAN & FRYDL, supra note 6.

61. The recent lethal shooting of Oscar Grant at the Fruitvale Bay Area Rapid Transit station in
Oakland, CA, brought some of these issues to light. The police officer in question argues, as his
defense, that his intention was to use a Taser stun gun rather than his sidearm. Demian Bulwa.
Skeptical Judge Grants Bail to Former BART Cop, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 31, 2009, at A-i. available at

http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2oo9/oi/3i/MNBII5KCD5.DTL. There are detailed
regulations regarding the usage of stun guns. See Jim Leusner & Katie Fretland, Florida Police
Followed Guidelines in Campus Taser Incident, ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 8, 2oo8. Detailed guidelines
are created even for far less serious incidents. See, e.g., SAN LEANDRO POLICE DEPARTMENT GUIDELINES FOR
SCREENING VIOLATIONS, available at http://www.ci.san-leandro.ca.us/pd/GuidelinesScreeningViolations.pdf

(showing the San Leandro's police regulations on processing traffic offenses). In the United Kingdom,
detailed model guidelines are published by the Association of Chief Police Officers. See Assoc. of
Chief Police Officers, Policies, http://www.acpo.police.uk/policies.asp (last visited Nov. 17, 2oo9). It
should also be mentioned that the practice of publicizing departmental guidelines, as is true with many
other fundamental structures and practices, varies greatly across departments. See SKOGAN & FRYDL,
supra note 6, at 49-50.
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legal scholars, namely, how to examine enforcement decisions. On one
hand, the public is uncomfortable with the pursuit of what we perceive as
"minor infractions" in the "penumbra" of lawbreaking.2 Not only is
enforcement of these infractions seen as inefficient, it is also perceived as
unfair, especially when it violates a public understanding that
enforcement does not usually occur in such circumstances." On the other
hand, there are clearly situations in which underenforcement has dire
implications, particularly when underenforcement in inner-city, minoritypopulated neighborhoods, creates safe havens for crime in low-income
communities.64 Moreover, any constitutional constraints on police action
have to take into account possible variations across states, cities, and
even individual police departments, as well as implementation problems.
We now examine the existing balance of these considerations, as crafted
by the Supreme Court.
11. CURRENT CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON POLICE DISCRETION

Police discretion has come to the Supreme Court's attention
through two main constitutional vehicles: the Fourth Amendment's
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, and the Equal
Protection Clause's defense against discrimination.
A.

FOURTH AMENDMENT LITIGATION

The Fourth Amendment contains two directives for law
enforcement: there shall be no "unreasonable searches and seizures,"
and the mandate that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause." 65 These two clauses can be referred to as the "reasonableness
clause" and the "warrant clause" respectively. Over time, as the Supreme
Court developed legal standards for reviewing police conduct, it steadily
moved from its initial reliance on the warrant clause to the current
primacy of the reasonableness clause. "Reasonableness," in the Fourth
Amendment context, has been interpreted to refer almost exclusively to
the level of police suspicion, underemphasizing the importance of
prioritizing and maintaining a sense of proportion. While some local
jurisdictions have found ways to limit police power with regard to trivial
matters, as well as prohibit racial profiling and pretextual police
activities, the Supreme Court has not responded to these concerns when
framing police discretion in constitutional terms.

62. See Raymond, supra note 5, at

1420.

63. Id. Raymond goes as far as to suggest that underenforcement of penumbral crimes "might
simply reflect a different type of criminal law-one that enforces a widely recognized norm that
happens to differ, in a universally understood dimension, from the expressed legal standard." Id
64. See Natapoff, supra note 8, at 1748-50.
65. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
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From the Warrant Requirement to Reasonableness
Historically, the Fourth Amendment was understood as a
prohibition on general warrants, common tools of the crown in the
colonies.66 The Framers considered general warrants to be the most
serious concern with regard to searches and seizures, because the power
of peace officers was quite limited and warrantless searches were
uncommon." The reasonableness clause was included to underscore the
strength of the Framers' conviction that the use of general warrants
should be banished in the United States," and to serve as a "background
value" for applying the warrant clause."
Until the mid-twentieth century, the warrant clause was the entire
thrust of the amendment; the Supreme Court even suggested that a
warrantless search was always invalid. 0 The reasonableness clause was
only invoked when the Court faced situations in which obtaining a
warrant was impracticable, and even then it was used sparingly.7 For
example, in Chimel v. California, the Court rejected the argument that
any search incident to arrest is inherently reasonable and hence
permissible under the Fourth Amendment.7 2 Such reasoning outlived its
usefulness, however, and just four years later the Court reversed course
on the question of searches incident to arrest. 3
In an article tracing the changing focus of the Court from the
warrant requirement to the reasonableness clause, Thomas Davies
argues that the modern reliance on the reasonableness clause is a
product of "post-framing developments that the Framers did not
anticipate."74 This is a provocative assertion, since the most devout
originalists on the Court were the ones to push the reasonableness clause
to the forefront." Justice Scalia backs up his reliance on the
reasonableness clause with an interpretation of history and general
i.

66. See Thomas J. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MicH. L. REV. 547, 551
(0999).
67. Id. As Davies explains, the cities and towns of eighteenth-century America had no "police
departments'7 at all, but rather a single sheriff and a jail staff. Id. at 552.
68. Id. at 551 ("The evidence indicates that the Framers understood 'unreasonable searches and
seizures' simply as a pejorative label for the inherent illegality of any searches or seizures that might
be made under general warrants.").
69. Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of Camara and
Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV. 383, 387-88 (1988).
70. See Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 32 (1925).
71. See Sundby, supra note 69, at 386.
72. 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969); see also Sunby, supra note 69 (discussing Chimel, 395 U.S. 752).
73. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973).

74. Davies, supra note 66, at 552.
75. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 583 (1991) (Scalia. J., concurring) ("In my view, the
path out of this confusion should be sought by returning to the first principle that the 'reasonableness'
requirement of the Fourth Amendment affords the protection that the common law afforded.").
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warrants." However, regardless of historical disagreements as to the
Founders' intent, the Court's shift in emphasis from the warrant clause to
the reasonableness clause was fueled by practical considerations. Two of
these important considerations were the rise of the regulatory state (with
the resulting need to conduct administrative searches outside the normal
crime-scene context),7 and drug and gang wars, which led to the
increased use of pretextual prosecutions built on evidence obtained
through Terry stops.7' The shift from warrant to reasonableness both
created and exacerbated problems related to arbitrary and unforeseeable
overenforcement of minor infractions.
a. Administrative Searches and the Rise of the
Regulatory State
Modern government includes a regulatory scheme covering citizens'
daily lives. As regulations have been promulgated, the Court has allowed
warrantless searches as a means of enforcing those regulations.7 9 Some
examples of the diverse set of contexts for these searches include
highway sobriety checkpoints,8o border searches,8' suspicionless searches
of parolees,82 and locker searches in schools. 8' These "administrative
searches" allow the modern regulatory state to function, and so the
Court has bowed to the government's demand for more efficient
enforcement by allowing warrantless searches." The Court has
characterized administrative searches as being essentially regulatory, as
opposed to penal, in nature, and thus not as deserving of Fourth
Amendment scrutiny." This logic breaks down, however, when the fruits

76. See id. at 581-82.
77. See infra Part II.A.i.a.
78. See infra Part II.A.i.b; see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. i,1io (1968).

79. See Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 525 (1967) ("[M]ore intensive efforts at all levels of
government to contain and eliminate urban blight have led to increasing use of such inspection
techniques...."); see also Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-74 (1987) (holding that certain
places, such as prisons or schools, give rise to special needs beyond general law enforcement, which
necessitate warrantless searches on something less than probable cause); United States v. Montoya de
Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 (1985) (holding that the government's interest in controlling the entry of
people and things into the country allows for the detention of travelers at the international border on
less than probable cause).
8o. See Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
81. See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 6o6 (977).
82. See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006).
83. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).

84. Id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment) ("[S]pecial needs, beyond the normal
need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable . . . ."); see
also Posting of Ryan Singel to Wired Magazine's Threat Level Blog, FCC's Warrantless Household
Searches Alarm Experts, http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2oo9/o5/fc-raid/ (May 21, 2009, x2:oo am)
(showing a recent example of the extent of such permissions: the Federal Communications
Commission's authority to search every home in which a wireless router can be found).
85. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 ('987) ("[C]onducting searches pursuant to a
regulatory scherne need not adhere to the usual warrant or probable-cause requirements as long as
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of a search conducted for a regulatory purpose are then used to
prosecute.
Administrative searches are evaluated by the Court under the
reasonableness standard, balancing the degree of intrusion upon the
citizen against the government's need for the intrusion." In Camara v.
District Court, Justice White made a leap of logic from required probable
cause to reasonableness when he wrote that "[t]he warrant procedure is
designed to guarantee that a decision to search private property is
justified by a reasonable governmental interest. But reasonableness is
still the ultimate standard.""
It is important to note one significant restriction on the power of
police to conduct administrative searches: The officer should not have
the discretion to choose whom he or she searches." This point is quite
central to the discussion since one of the most difficult challenges faced
by the police is responding to the public critique of nonrandom
enforcement, such as racial profiling."9 It could even be said that the vast
powers to conduct intrusive administrative searches based on little or no
suspicion are "cleansed," to a great extent, by their random nature.9
b. Gang Violence and the Drug War
The second practical reason for the shift to reasonableness is the
changing focus of law enforcement, especially in urban centers, from
property and personal crimes to narcotic and gun crimes. Armed with the
investigatory tool of the Terry stop, police tactics have evolved to
confront the new threats.
As the face of urban crime has changed over the past generation,
police forces have turned to drug and gun crime ("gun crime" defined as
offenses involving gun registration and licensing) as a way to combat
violent crime.9 This is police work by proxy, made necessary by, among
other things, the reluctance of witnesses in gang-controlled
neighborhoods to come forward and provide crucial eyewitness evidence
to gang related crimes." Faced with increasing difficulty when solving
their searches meet 'reasonable legislative or administrative standards."' (emphasis added) (quoting
Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523,538 (1967))).
86. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 325 (discussing this constitutional balancing act).
87. 387 U.S. at 539.
88. Wesley MacNeil Oliver, With an Evil Eye and an Unequal Hand: Pretextual Stops and
DoctrinalRemedies to Racial Profiling, 74 TUL. L. REV. I4o9, 1438 (2ooo).

89. Indeed, many police departments have begun to collect data on their stops and license checks
to examine whether they are conducted in a random manner. SKOGAN & FRYDL, supra note 6, at 32022.

90. Compare the Supreme Court's permissive approach toward random stops, see Mich. Dep't of
State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447 (1990), to its attitude toward nonrandomized checks, see
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (i979).
91. See William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1969, 2020 (2008).
92. Id. at 2021. Stuntz also considers factors such as the Warren Court's criminal procedure

jurisprudence

and the increase in the ratio of stranger crime to have contributed to the increasing
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urban violent crime, law enforcement turned to drug and gun laws to
provide more easily proven prosecutions, all with the explicit approval
and encouragement of the government. President Clinton directed the
FBI to use drug prosecutions to take down gangs in the same way that
tax prosecutions were used to take down Al Capone. 93 The federal
program "Project Safe Neighborhoods" utilizes aggressive prosecution of
two particular gun laws.94 The U.S. Code prohibits felons from possessing
a firearm,' and enhances sentences for those caught with guns "during
and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime."96
Through this program, state law enforcement agencies refer cases to
federal prosecutors in order to take advantage of much harsher
sentencing regimes, with the stated goal of obtaining "the longest
sentence possible." 97
Narcotic crime in particular lends itself to pretextual criminal justice
policies. Not only are drug crimes relatively easily prosecuted," but
sentencing rates for such offenses have steadily increased since the
I98os,99 and are comparable to sentences for violent crimes.o
Furthermore, there is little public outcry because the practice is generally
popular for its getting the "bad guys off the street," even if their more
heinous crimes remain unsolved. Terry stops are a common method for
IOI
obtaining evidence in narcotic and gun cases.
Interestingly, there is a historical model for pretextual prosecutions
of minor infractions. Prohibition, which was enforced with wide disparity
in different parts of the country, is an early example of a crime that
caused progressive Justices Holmes and Brandeis to begin "to question
difficulty police departments find in "clearing" violent crimes. Id. at 2017 n.229.
93. Id. at 2020.
94. See Bonita R. Gardner, Separate and Unequal: Federal Tough-on-Guns Program Targets
Minority Communities for Selective Enforcement, 12 MICH. J. RACE & L. 305, 3 12 (207).
95. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(I) (2oo6).
96. Id. § 924(c)(I)(a).
97. Gardner, supra note 94, at 307 (citing Press Release, Debra W. Yang, L.A. Law Enforcement

Officials Roll-Out Project Safe Neighborhoods (Dec. 18, 2003)). For a more recent example of aggressive
prosecution, see Cross Currents: US Attorney Russoniello's Tough on Drugs Tactics (KALW Radio

broadcast May 4,2009), availableat http://www.crosscurrentsradio.org/features.php?story id=2083.
98. Drug cases are more likely to be prosecuted than other crimes. See Bureau of Justice
Statistics, Drugs and Crime Facts: Drug Law Violations and Pretrial, Prosecution, and Adjudication,
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/dcf/ptrpa.cfm.
99. KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN

POLITICS 95-96 (997).
1oo. This is especially true with one or more prior convictions. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 2Di.I (2007) (Unlawful Manufacturing, Importing, Exporting, or Trafficking (Including

Possession with Intent to Commit These Offenses)).
ioi. Wayne R. LaFave, The "Routine Traffic Stop" From Start To Finish: Too Much "Routine"
Not Enough Fourth Amendment, lo2 MICHs. L. REV. 1843, 1852-53 (2004). Also used are "buy and
bust"~ operations, which instead utilize the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine to obtain the necessary

THE
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evidence. See RICHARD VAN DUIZzEND ET AL.,
SEARCH WARRANT
PRECONCEPTIONS,
PERCEPTIONS, AND PRACTrICES 19, 68 -71 (1984); see also SKOGAN &FRYDL, supra note 6, at 267.
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the legitimacy of positive law that lacked resonance with the customs and
mores of the population."" Just as modern narcotics laws were enacted
to combat violent crime from an indirect angle, Prohibition was intended
to accomplish societal changes that direct prosecutions could not, such as
promoting workplace effectiveness, Americanizing new immigrants,
controlling Southern blacks, and generalized crime reduction."
Prohibition was an early incarnation of the tactics used today in the drug
war. In the end, Prohibition failed (partially) due to the inequitable
enforcement of the laws."o4 However, narcotic laws, which are enforced
far less equitably than Prohibition laws ever were, seem much less likely
to follow the same fate."' One might conclude that modem Americans,
as a society, are more concerned with the social blight associated with
narcotics than their ancestors were with alcohol, that there is simply no
comparable demand for the freedom to use narcotics responsibly as there
was a demand for drinking responsibly, or that modern America is much
more tolerant of this kind of ends-orientated law enforcement. The
Supreme Court appears to hold this last view.
2.
The Robinson-Whren-Atwater Problem of Search Discretion
The current state of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence allows little
room for a defendant to challenge his or her stop or search based on any
argument other than level of suspicion. The combination of three cases,
harnessed together, precludes a defendant from making any other
argument. First, United States v. Robinson established the "search
incident to arrest" doctrine."'6 In the years since Robinson was decided,
this "exception" has become the rule, and searches incident to arrest are
now a commonly used technique to gather evidence." Next, in United
States v. Whren, the Court endorsed-or at least failed to repudiate-the
growing police practice of pretextual stops."' The Court held that as long
as police had probable cause to believe some crime was being committed,
they could make a stop, regardless of whether the crime that precipitated
the stop had anything to do with the real reason that the officer made the
stop.' Finally, in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, the Court held that a
police officer could make an arrest for any violation, no matter how

102. Robert Post, Federalism, Positive Law, and the Emergence of the American Administrative
State: Prohibitionin the Taft Court Era, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. I, 2 (2006).
103. Id. at 16-17. With respect to alcohol prohibition, see generally JOSEPH R. GUSFIELD, SYMBOLIC
CRUSADE: STATUS POLITICS AND THE AMERICAN TEMPERANCE MOVEMENT (1968).
104. Stuntz, supra note 91, at 2024 ("A critical mass of Prohibition's supporters evidently
concluded that repeal was preferable to uneven enforcement.").
io. Id.
xo6. 414 U.S. 218, 224, 234 (1973).
£07. VAN DUIZEND ET AL., supra note 101, at 19. 68-71.
io8. 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
109. Id. at 813-15-

December.2oo9]

INEQUITABLE ENFORCEMENT

431

small."0 These three cases work together to give law enforcement broad,
highly discretionary search authority. This allows officers to tail a
suspicious vehicle until some picayune vehicle code violation is observed,
thereby furnishing probable cause for the stop, arrest, and subsequent
search.
The problematic aspect of the Robinson-Whren-Atwater line of
decisions lies in the decisions' reliance on probable cause as a bulwark
against undesirable police activity. The reliance on probable cause has
outlived its usefulness on streets where police can almost always find
some kind of vehicle code violation with which to beat back a
defendant's invocation of his or her Fourth Amendment right. For
example, testimony in a class action lawsuit filed against the Illinois State
Police' revealed the following statistics: Hispanics, who account for less
than eight percent of the state population and take less than three
percent of personal vehicle trips in the state, account for nearly thirty
percent of motorists stopped for "very minor traffic offenses" (defined as
failure to signal a lane change or speeding one to four miles per hour
above posted limit)."' The wild disparities in enforcement of minor
infractions would not be such a crisis if the problem was confined to
differences in monetary sanctions, rather than intrusions into privacy.
However, the problem does not just occur with stops and citations: the
same testimony revealed that Hispanics in Illinois accounted for twenty
seven percent of vehicle searches, which have a more intrusive nature
and potentially higher stakes." 3 This phenomenon is not limited to
Illinois, either. In Maryland, a class action suit settlement required state
police to keep records of stops and searches, and the statistics are
alarming: black drivers accounted for 16.9% of all drivers on the 1-95
corridor and yet, on that stretch of road, 72.9% of all drivers whose
vehicles were searched were black." 4 When such disparate practices lead
to searches and arrests based more on hunches and stereotypes than on
proper police
investigation, constitutional protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures is clearly failing.
Moreover, the reasonableness of a detention or search must rest on
something more than probable cause that any violation has occurred.
The text of the Fourth Amendment contains two admonitions: no
unreasonable searches and seizures, and no arrests without probable
cause." 5 Over time, these separate issues have been condensed into a

1n0. 532 U.S. 318,354(2001).

iIi. Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 27 F. Supp. 2d 1053 (N.D. Ill.
1998), aff'd, 251 F.3d 6I2 (7th Cir.
2001).
312. Oliver, supra note

88, at 1424-25.
Id.
3313.
314. Id. at 3423.
i15. See U.S. CONsI. amend. IV.
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single analysis, such that the current state of the law can be summarized
as follows: if there is probable cause for the stop, it is therefore
reasonable." 6 The problem with this rule is demonstrated by the
penumbral crimes situation in which a search is conducted pursuant to
probable cause (i.e., the officer observes a minor traffic offense, which is
more than mere suspicion that the offense has occurred), but is
unreasonable due to the discretion employed by the officer. In short, by
relying on suspicion as the sole index of reasonableness, not only do we
relinquish the ability to review other aspects of police discretion, but
effectively allow the police to disregard criticisms of their use of
discretion and use stops as an enforcement tool for trifling matters.
Some of the challenges of pretextual police activity for seemingly
trifling matters appear to have been addressed in the recently decided
Arizona v. Gant."7 Overruling current doctrine regarding search incident
to arrest, the Court limited the scope of vehicle searches to exigent
circumstances or to evidence pertaining directly to the offense of
arrest."' Nevertheless, newer interpretations of the Gant rule indicate
that its scope is rather limited, and that evidence need not be excluded
merely because the arrest offense was a minor one."'
As previously discussed, the gut-level reaction to inequitable
enforcement is a simple feeling of unfairness. However, "unfair" police
activity is not prohibited by the Constitution. 20 Rather, the Constitution
is concerned only with activity that is "unreasonable."' There are
several ways in which the parties in previous lawsuits have attempted to
overcome this limitation, and by exploring their arguments we hope to
demonstrate the intractability of the problem.

ii6. The best illustration of this is Virginia v. Moore, I28 S. Ct. 1598, r6o8 (2009), in which a
violation of state law did not impact the reasonability of a probable-cause-based search.
117. 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009).

II8. Id. at 1723-24.
99. See United States v. Ruckes, No. o8-3oo88, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 24578, at *14-15 (9th Cir.

Nov. 9, 2009).
We therefore hold that, while the search cannot be upheld as incident to arrest in light of
Gant, the deterrent rationale for the exclusionary rule is not applicable where the evidence
would have ultimately been discovered during a police inventory of the contents of Ruckes's
car.
[T]he district court must conduct a case-by-case inquiry to determine whether a
lawful path to discovery-such as inevitability-exists in each case. To hold otherwise would
create an impermissible loop-hole in the Court's bright-line Gant determination.
Id. This potential "loop hole" could consist of an Atwater arrest for a minor offense, if the reviewing
court's discretion allows it.
120. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 21, Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 398 (200')
(No. 99-9408) ("It's not a constitutional violation for a police officer to be a jerk.").
921. See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) ("[T]he ultimate touchstone of the
Fourth Amendment is reasonableness. .. )
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The first is to attempt to plumb the common law for a historical rule
that supports a limitation on police arrest authority. The appellants and
their amici in Atwater and Whren took this tack and argued in their briefs
and at oral argument that a standard could be discerned from the
historical record of American and English legal tradition.'22 Specifically,
these parties proposed limiting arrest authority to those crimes that
would be considered "breaches of the peace" under the common law. 3
The Court dismissed this line of argument by pointing to the practical
flaws inherent in such a rule; as Justice Breyer put it, "a policeman isn't
going to know the common law or breaches of the peace. A policethey're just not going to understand that." 24
Beyond the practical problem identified by Justice Breyer, there is a
more fundamental problem with looking to the common law to find
solutions to problems never contemplated prior to the current vehicle
code regime. Theories of arrest authority from eighteenth-century
England just do not work very well in a world where state vehicle codes
run to thousands of pages and contain violations as trivial as the signalfor-three-seconds-prior-to-turning requirement, which the petitioner in
Whren neglected to follow."'
Another approach is to look to police rules and regulations for
guidance. This was a strategy that the petitioner took in Whren, arguing
that the police regulations prohibiting plainclothes officers from making
traffic stops rendered the stop (by plainclothes officers in an unmarked
car) unreasonable.26 The Court responded by pointing out that such a
rule would result in widely varying levels of Fourth Amendment
protection across the country, 27depending on the regulations that each
police department might enact.
3. Legislative and Lower Court Responses
The inherent unfairness of a system that provides no constitutional
protection against arbitrary demonstrations of police power has not gone
unnoticed by legislatures and lower courts. However, the Supreme Court
wields the "probable cause" argument to repel each attempt to create
some limits on police search authority. Virginia passed a law that
122. See Brief Amici Curiae of the National Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers & the Ass'n of
Federal Defenders in Support of the Petitioners at 4-£7, Atwater, 532 U.S. 318 (No. 99-1408);

Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note I2o, at II-12.
123. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 120, at 13.
124. Id. at 15.
125. Raymond, supra note 5, at 1401-I.
126. Transcript of Oral Argument at 12-13, Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 8o6 (1996) (No. 95-

5841); Brief for the Petitioners at 37, Whren, 517 U.S. 8o6 (No. 95-584I).
£27. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note £26, at i5-i6; see also Whren, 517 U.S. at 8i5
("Moreover, police enforcement practices, even if they could be practicably assessed by a judge, vary
from place to place and from time to time. We cannot accept that the search and seizure protections of
the Fourth Amendment are so variable."); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 267 (i973).
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restricted the arrest authority of police officers when confronted with
minor offenses.128 It instructed police officers to issue a summons and
then release the detained person.' In Virginia v. Moore, the petitioner
was arrested in contravention of that state law and was subsequently
searched incident to the arrest.' The search turned up drugs, which were
used as evidence against him."' Moore's motion to suppress the evidence
uncovered in the search was denied, 3 the Virginia Supreme Court
reversed,' 33 and then the United States Supreme Court reversed again,
holding that police did not violate the Fourth Amendment when making
an arrest that was prohibited by state law because the arrest was based
on probable cause that a crime had occurred.'
In Moore, the Court followed the same logic as in Whren, 35 but
pushed the argument much further. The Moore Court held that an officer
making an arrest in violation of a state law does not render the search
pursuant to that arrest unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment."63
The reasonableness determination is simply a question of probable
cause, and while police departments or states may adopt standards more
protective than those set by the Constitution, these standards do not
affect the Court's determination of reasonableness.137 The result of this
opinion was to defang any legislative attempt to restrict the arrest
authority of police officers: if it is no constitutional violation for police
officers to make arrests in direct contravention of their states' law, then
there is no meaningful restriction available for an elected representative
to enact. Such an interpretation of Moore is supported by commentators
who have read a similar rule in Knowles v. Iowa."8 Knowles, which on its
face appeared to bolster the cause of those seeking to restrict arrest
2

128. VA. CODE ANN.

§ 19.2-74

(2008).

129. Id. ("Whenever any person is detained by or is in the custody of an arresting officer for any

violation committed in such officer's presence which offense is a violation of any county, city or town
ordinance or of any provision of this Code punishable as a Class I or Class 2 misdemeanor ... the
arresting officer shall take the name and address of such person and issue a summons or otherwise
notify him in writing to appear at a time and place to be specified in such summons or notice. Upon
the giving by such person of his written promise to appear at such time and place, the officer shall
forthwith release him from custody. However, if any such person shall fail or refuse to discontinue the
unlawful act, the officer may proceed according to the provisions of § 19.2-82.").
130. 128 S. Ct. 1598, 16oI-02 (2oo8).
131. Id. at 1602.
132. Id.
133. 636 S.E.2d 395, 400 (Va. 2oo6).

134. Moore, 128 S. Ct. at 1602-o8.
135. 517 U.S. 8o6, 813-19 (2oo8).

136. Moore, 128 S. Ct. at 16o5. Furthermore, Justice Scalia dismissed the idea that departmental
rules and regulations carried any weight, writing that "founding-era citizens were skeptical of using the
rules for search and seizure set by government actors as the index of reasonableness." Id. at 1603.
'37. Id. at i6o8.
138. 525 U.S. 113 (1998).
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discretion,"' has been interpreted as rejecting bright-line rules (such as
the Virginia law) that seek to limit officers' authority to make arrests.1 4
Virginia is not alone in seeking to use legislation to change stopand-search law that lends itself so easily to abuse. Seventeen other states
have passed laws that both prohibit precisely what the Court approved in
Whren (racial profiling), and require that law enforcement agencies
maintain racial statistics on stops and searches.141
Another potential approach is the one suggested by the Tenth
Circuit (and rejected by the Supreme Court), which requires examinmmg
not just the legality of the police officer's actions, but also his common
sense, through an objective lens.' 42
It seems, therefore, that while states have acknowledged the
problem of arrest for minor infractions and have taken steps to limit
police action, constitutional review has been reluctant to restrict police
power beyond a required level of suspicion. This has been problematic in
terms of enforcement of minor infractions, and has consequently led to
inequitable enforcement. We now turn to the problem of inequitability in
the context of the Equal Protection Clause.
0

B.

EQUAL PROTECTION

Equal protection litigation regarding police power is an important
avenue because the Court has been reluctant to address the issue of
inequality and discrimination through the Fourth Amendment.143 As

139. See id. at i18-19. An officer chose to cite a motorist rather than arrest him, despite having the
authority to do so. Id. at 14. He then proceeded to conduct a search, later pronounced
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. Id. The decision pointed out that search incident to arrest can
only be conducted when an actual arrest has been made; mere authority to arrest is not enough. Id. at
117-18.
140. See Oliver, supra note 88, at 1453.
141. See Michael R. Smith, Depoliticizing Racial Profiling: Suggestions for the Limited Use and
Management of Race in Police Decision-Making, 15 GEO. MASON U. CIv. RTs. L.J. 219, 219 & n.2
(2005).

142. The "would have" rule from the Tenth Circuit is: a court should ask "not whether the officer
could validly have made the stop but whether under the same circumstances a reasonable officer
would have made the stop in the absence of the invalid purpose." United States v. Guzman, 864 F. 2d
1512, 1515 (ioth Cir. 1988) (quoting United States v. Smith, 799 F. 2d 704, 709 (ith Cir. 1986)).
That an officer theoretically could validly have stopped the car for a possible traffic
infraction [i]s not determinative. Similarly immaterial [i]s the actual subjective intent of the
deputy. [A] stop [i]s unreasonable not because the officer secretly hope[s] to find evidence
of a greater offense, but because it [iUs clear that an officer would have been uninterested in
pursuing the lesser offense absent that hope.
Id. at 1517 (alterations in original) (second emphasis added) (quoting Smith, 799 F.2d at 74o). The
Guzman test was overruled in United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 (roth Cir. 1995), which
held that a "traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment if the stop is based on an observed

traffic violation or if police officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that traffic or equipment
violation has occurred or is occurring"
443. See supra Part IIA.
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Justice Scalia explains in Whren, "We of course agree with petitioners
that the Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on
considerations such as race. But the constitutional basis for objecting to
intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection
Clause."'" This is the Court's only reference to the crucial issue it
"effectively sidestepped" by focusing solely on probable cause as
grounds for police discretion.' 45 While, arguably, "reasonability" can
(and, as we suggest later, should) be interpreted to encompass
considerations of equal and consistent enforcement, we now examine
how the Equal Protection Clause has been used to address problems in
police discretion.
Uneven enforcement is accepted, to some degree, as an inevitable
aspect of traffic laws. It is not feasible, nor desirable, for the police to
enforce all the traffic violations committed in their presence.' At first
glance, equal protection does not enter into the discussion unless there is
a discriminatory way in which the police decide whom to stop. It is the
discriminatory intent of the officer-and the resulting discriminatory
effect-which, in the past, has raised the equal protection issue.4
As this section demonstrates, equal protection arguments have
rarely been raised with respect to police enforcement because of two
limiting aspects of the doctrine: (i)the need to prove intentional
discrimination; and (2) the need to show not only that a specific group
has been targeted, but also that the group falls into the category of a
"suspect class." Both of these components are extremely difficult to
prove, and are very problematic from theoretical and empirical
perspectives.
i.

Intentional Discrimination

In order to prevail in equal protection suits, plaintiffs must prove
both discriminatory purpose and discriminatory effect.' The line of
cases involving equal protection challenges to governmental policies
concerning voting,'49 affirmative action in schools,'50 and marriage'
required this particularly high standard for proving actual discrimination.
In Davis, the Court justified this choice of standard in the negativepointing out flaws in other approaches instead of heralding the
advantages of this one:

517 U.S. 8o6, 813 (2oo8).
145. See Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425, 426 n.io (1997).
146. See Barbara C. Salken, The General Warrant of the Twentieth Century? A Fourth Amendment
Solution to Unchecked Discretion to Arrest for Traffic Offenses, 62 TEMP. L. REV. 221, 223 (1989).
147. See infra Part I.B.i.
148. Washington v.Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238 42 (1976).
149. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.s. 533, 538-54 (1964).

144.

150 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v.Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 269 (1978).
x5i. Loving v.Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967).
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A rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is nevertheless
invalid, absent compelling justification, if in practice it benefits or
burdens one race more than another would be far reaching and would
raise serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of
tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes that may
be more burdensome to the poor and to the average black than to the
more affluent white.'52
Rather than take such a risk, the Court instead adopted the intent-todiscriminate standard.'5 3
This extraordinarily high standard has been roundly criticized by
both civil rights leaders (who view it as a roadblock to legitimate
litigation)' 54 and constitutional scholars."' The academic argument is that
the Court in Davis gave short shrift to the meaning of the Equal
Protection Clause by limiting its application to "discriminatory
purpose.""' Michael Perry argues that the Court's approach precludes
consideration of the much more common form of racial discrimination:
disproportionate racial impact."' This idea-that from laws that have a
much greater effect on a particular race, one can not only infer racial bias
but also identify injury-is not particularly sophisticated. But its
implications (which the Court fears would be "far reaching"'58), go
straight to the heart of discrimination. Perry's critique centers on the
exclusion of disproportionate racial impact from the set of criteria that
may be regarded as evidence of equal protection violations, pointing out
that the most damaging "official" racial discrimination could slip through
the Court's relatively porous test.159

152. Davis, 426 U.S. at 248.

153. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 320-21 (1987). Lawrence summarizes the Court's objections as follows:
(i) A standard that would subject all governmental action with a racially disproportionate

impact to strict judicial scrutiny would cost too much; such a standard, the Court argues,
would substantially limit legitimate legislative decisionmaking and would endanger the
validity of a "whole range of [existing] tax, welfare, public service, regulatory and licensing
statutes"; (2) a disproportionate impact standard would make innocent people bear the
costs of remedying a harm in which they played no part; (3) an impact test would be
inconsistent with equal protection values, because the judicial decisionmaker would have to
explicitly consider race; and (4) it would be inappropriate for the judiciary to choose to
remedy the racially disproportionate impact of otherwise neutral governmental actions at
the expense of other legitimate social interests.
Id. (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Davis, 426 U.S. at 248 & n.14).
154. Id. at 319.
155. Id.

156. Michael J. Perry, The DisproportionateImpact Theory of Racial Discrimination, 125 U. PA. L.
REv. 540, 541 (1977).
157. Id. at 544. Perry notes that the Court in Davis did consider, albeit briefly, disproportionate
racial impact, but dismissed it nearly summarily. See id. at 542-44.
158. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976).

'59. Perry, supra note '56, at 548-49 ("The 'discriminatory purpose' terminology used in
Washington and elsewhere, however, is misleading. The central prohibition of the equal protection
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Charles Lawrence makes a more fundamental argument: to focus on
conscious, intentional discrimination fails to account for the great
majority of unconscious, unintentional discrimination, which has a much
more pronounced effect across society.'6' While conceding that the law
might not be the vehicle through which we address this fundamental
issue in society, Lawrence argues that "equal protection doctrine must
find a way to come to grips with unconscious racism."'61
There is a bright spot in the Court's otherwise dismally short-sighted
equal protection jurisprudence. In the context of criminal procedure
(albeit not in the context of police discretion), the Court has not
demanded quite as much from the plaintiff as in civil suits. In Batson v.
Kentucky, the Court held that equal protection forbade the use of
peremptory challenges based solely on race.' The Court further held
that a prima facie case could be made for discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges if the claimant could prove the following:
[T]he defendant first must show that he is a member of a cognizable
racial group, and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory
challenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant's race.
Second, the defendant is entitled to rely on the fact, as to which there
can be no dispute, that peremptory challenges constitute a jury
selection practice that permits "those to discriminate who are of a mind
to discriminate." Finally, the defendant must show that these facts and
any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor
used that practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on
account of their race. This combination of factors in the empaneling of
the petit jury, as in the selection of the venire, raises the necessary
inference of purposeful discrimination.

For our purposes, the point that merits special attention in Batson is
the Court's use of inference as an indicator of discrimination-exactly
what the Court has refused to do in other contexts. As other scholars
have commented, in the context of police action, the Davis requirement
of proving intentional discrimination in effect requires an officer's
admission of racial bias in order for a defendant to prove
discrimination."' But the Batson requirement appears to be more easily
met in the context of inequitable enforcement. In the inequitable
enforcement context, the test from Batson would allow the inference of
clause [sic] is directed against the government's deliberate use of race as a criterion of selection. A law
might employ a racial criterion of selection as a means to an objective, or purpose, having nothing to
do with race." (footnote omitted)).
x6o. See Lawrence, supra note 153; see also Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, i18 HARv. L. REV.
1489 (2005); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to
Discriminationand Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. I161 (1995).

16x. Lawrence,supra note 153, at 323.
162. 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986).
163. Id. at 96 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559. 562
('953)).
164. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 145, at 437.

December 2oo9]

INEQUITABLE ENFORCEMENT

439

purposeful discrimination from a combination of factors, such as the
disparity between the severity of the offense and the intensity of police
response, the deviation from police regulations, and the citizen's
socioeconomic characteristics. However, drawing an inference of
purpose from the circumstances surrounding the stop, search, or arrest
might not be sufficient; equal protection arguments have been successful
only in the context of discrimination against specific groups.
2.
The Problem of Suspect Classifications
While the problem of inequitable enforcement appears especially
ugly in the context of racially-motivated pretextual stops, dealing with
inequity on the basis of race overlooks the larger components of
arbitrary enforcement. Inequitable enforcement might occur against
groups whom constitutional litigation does not currently recognize as a
''suspect class."
The importance of suspect classification stems from the fact that the
Court's equal protection rulings invariably reflect its decision on the
appropriate standard of constitutional review to be used in each case. If
the Court uses strict scrutiny, the governmental action is usually deemed
unconstitutional; 6 5 if the Court uses rational basis, the action is usually
deemed constitutional. 66 The Court has established that, absent a
showing of a suspect class, the Court will use the ultradeferential rational
basis standard of review.6' Therefore, citizens who have suffered from
inequitable enforcement can only prevail if they show they are members
of a "suspect class."
The idea behind limiting equal protection to suspect classes requires
a few words of explanation. John Ely, beginning from Justice Stone's
famous footnote in Carolene Products,'6' posits that the theory of strict
165. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 ('980) (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment)
("[S]trict in theory, but fatal in fact.").
166. See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992).
167. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 (1938).
168. See id. at 152 n.4
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when
legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as

those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be
embraced within the Fourteenth.
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation,
is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the
Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation....
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes
directed at particular religious or national or racial minorities: whether prejudice against
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail
the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities,
and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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scrutiny derives from a failure in process, that the Court must give more
protection to groups who lack the power in the political sphere to
address their plight. 6 9Ely's insight is that the failure in process is due to
the identity of the group as different from the majority-that prejudice
keeps the minority group from forming coalitions and thereby achieving
success in the political process.' A minority group fails to form
coalitions not because it is a minority group, but because its status as
"different" precludes others from joining in its common cause."' Hence,
the Court limits equal protection to easily identifiable minority groups.
The Court has taken the "discrete and insular" group phrase from
Carolene Products and turned it into shorthand for those groups
requiring special judicial solicitude. "But by only suspecting laws that
classify by race on their face or are the result of overtly self-conscious
racial motivation, the theory stops an important step short of locating
and eliminating the defect it has identified."' 72 In other words, in
reserving strict scrutiny for only those groups which are obviously
suspect (i.e., those that are discriminated against purposely), the Court
asks us to blind ourselves to all but the most blatant discrimination.
In the context of inequitable enforcement, victims of arbitrary or
disproportionate police actions may be random. Though the patterns
may reveal racial biases in particular settings, as a general principle there
is no "group" to which the victims belong, save the "group" of people
who have violated the law by committing a minor infraction, or who have
been treated harshly by the police in a disproportionate manner.
Recently, Charles Epp, Steven Maynard-Moody, and Donald HaiderMarkel found that, while black drivers are stopped more often, police
officers treat disrespectful white drivers significantly more harshly than
disrespectful black drivers.' 73 Epp and his coauthors interpret these
results to possibly mean that officers impose official intrusions and
punishments on black drivers deliberately, rather than as a response to a
difficult interaction.'74 However, their findings also imply that some
nonracialized issues may yield harsh enforcement and be
indistinguishable from an equal protection perspective.7 1
Again, Lawrence's theory of inherent racism is useful as a
comparison. Lawrence identifies a certain circular, self-defeating logic in

169. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 151-53 (1980).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Lawrence, supra note 153, at 349.
173. See Charles R. Epp et al., Racial Profiling as Racialized Surveillance (unpublished paper
presented at the Law and Society Association Annual Meeting. Denver, CO (2009)).
'74. Id.
'75. Id.
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the intentional discrimination requirement of Davis.' By requiring a
plaintiff to show purposeful discrimination, the Court
creates an imaginary world where discrimination does not exist unless
it was consciously intended. . .. If there is no discrimination, there is no
need for a remedy; if blacks are being treated fairly yet remain at the
bottom of the socioeconomic ladder, only their own inferiority can
explain their subordinate position."'
Requiring purposeful discrimination before recognizing a violation of
equal protection is a mistake. Requiring the existence of a suspect class
compounds this same mistake.
One could even argue that, in some ways, arbitrary enforcement,
seemingly unrelated to race, might raise feelings of confusion and
mistrust beyond those raised in cases that more closely resemble racial
profiling. Trust in the police depends, to a great extent, on a citizen's
demographics. Studies have found lesser degrees of trust among minority
groups. ' While this tendency might be perpetuated by racialized
enforcement, arbitrary enforcement of minor infractions in violation of
police regulations might expand these sentiments of mistrust to other
population sectors.
In summation, the challenges of proving intent and suspect
classification make the Equal Protection Clause a problematic tool for
addressing inequitable enforcement, arguably more so than the Fourth
Amendment's reasonability requirement. We now turn to examine some
possible solutions.

III. INTRODUCING INEQUITABILITY INTO CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW
Given the limitations of the existing mechanisms of the Fourth
Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause, we suggest expanding the
criteria by which police activities are assessed to include other factors
about the offense, the situation, and the officer's response. We begin by
providing these additional variables and proceed by offering ways in
which they can be incorporated into existing constitutional discourse.
A. ASSESSING INEQUITABILITY: A MULTIVARIATE APPROACH
Given the limitations of a suspicion/discrimination approach to law
enforcement review, one proposed solution is to expand the criteria used
by the courts to assess "reasonability" of police action under the Fourth
Amendment to include other dimensions, such as unfairness,

176. See Lawrence, supra note 153, at 325.
177. Id.
578. See David A. Sklansky, Not Your Father's Police Department: Making Sense of the New
Demographics of Law Enforcement, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1209, 5228-29 (2006).
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arbitrariness, and lack of proportion. The Court in Whren hesitated to do
so, explaining:
Petitioners urge as an extraordinary factor in this case that the
"multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations" is so large
and so difficult to obey perfectly that virtually everyone is guilty of
violation, permitting the police to single out almost whomever they
wish for a stop. But we are aware of no principle that would allow us to
decide at what point a code of law becomes so expansive and so
commonly violated that infraction itself can no longer be the ordinary

measure of the lawfulness of enforcement. And even if we could identify

such exorbitant codes, we do not know by what standard (or what
right) we would decide, as petitioners would have us do, which
particular provisions are sufficiently important to merit enforcement."'
Indeed, quantifying inequitability is, as the Court correctly states,
problematic if one is to rely on a decisive principle. We also keep in mind
that it is not feasible, nor desirable, to allow every citizen who feels
indignant about police enforcement in her case to make a constitutional
argument against it. Finally, we acknowledge that the balance in each of
these categories of equitability may differ across states, cities, and police
departments; notions of fairness could depend on local conditions and
relationships. For these reasons, we believe that a multifactor analysis,
taking into account a variety of issues concerning the offense,
enforcement policy, police response, and citizen demographics, is a more
useful tool. Granted, a multifactor approach to reasonability is not
devoid of problems and areas of vagueness, but we believe it still
clarifies, rather than obscures, the current standards (which, in
themselves, allow for areas of vagueness). We do not see this as a
liability, in light of the highly localized nature of American policing.
i.

Characteristicsof the Infraction

Different criminal offenses require different enforcement
approaches and, therefore, the type of law broken plays an important
part in assessing the reasonability of police response. One possible
distinction is the classic distinction between mala in se and mala
prohibita,' 8 ' which is relevant when making decisions about enforcement
priorities. The enforcement of mala prohibita offenses is not a moral
priority, but rather a regulation necessity. As such, the frequency and
intensity of enforcement should be tailored to meet the necessity and not
go beyond.

179. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818-19 (1995) (emphasis added).
Iso. See SKOGAN & FRYDL, supra note 6, at 55.

181. Mala in se offenses are acts, like murder, arson, or rape, that are considered "inherently
immoral." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 978 (8th ed. 2004). Mala prohibita offenses are wrong because
they are prohibited by positive laws. Id. The distinction is somewhat related to issues of severity, but
does not always overlap with the distinction between statutory offenses and major crimes. Werner
Bertelsmann, The Essence of Mens Rea. 1974 ACTA JURIDICA 34, 42 (1974).
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The mala in se/mala prohibita distinction, on its own, raises several
difficulties. First, in some cases the court might want to use mala
prohibita offenses as pretexts for the enforcement of mala in se
offenses.[' In addition, there are cases in which the distinction is not easy
to make, such as drug usage, which can be seen as an urban regulatory
matter or as a zealous moral war.' Viewing enforcement against drug
traffickers as a regulatory matter does not, however, mean that it is
unnecessary.' Similarly, viewing a certain issue as a moral fault does not
necessarily imply it should be a priority for law enforcers, particularly
given the concern over moral panics and crusades and their impact on
punitiveness.'

Another important factor is the severity of the offense. While the
severity as proscribed by the legislator is certainly relevant (in hopes that
law enforcement policy focuses on what the legislator deems important),
public perception of offense severity might also play an important role.
After all, a sense of unfairness and indignation arises more from the
incongruence between the intensity of enforcement and the perceived
severity of the lawbreakin incident than from the formal sentence
attached to the offense. 6 This assessment, while important, is
complicated by the fact that, while in some instances there is a strong
public consensus about severity (i.e., crimes against the person
consistently rank as more severe than crimes against property'), there
are some demographic differences in assessing severity."' The debate
between criminal law scholars and social scientists as to whether the
public shares a "natural" sense of fairness, justice, and appropriate
severity is relevant when relying on that sense to require fairness from
the police.'89
Similarly, for offenses in which the degree of deviation from the
norm can be quantified (i.e., speeding or drug possession), the quantified
difference might be an important parameter for measuring the
inequitability of enforcement. This parameter is similar to Raymond's

See supra Part I.
183. See TROY DUSTER, THE LEGISLATION OF MORALITY: LAW, DRUGS
184. ROBERT J. MACCOUN & PETER REUTER, DRUG WAR HERESIES:
182.

AND MORAL JUDGMENT (1972).
LEARNING FROM OTHER VICES,

TIMES AND PLACES 30-32 (2001).

185. The concern here might be about making the mistake of typifying crimes committed by
certain people as more "morally wrong" than others. A classic example is the moral weight attached
by politicians and interest groups to drug abuse by minorities, leading to the prohibition of some drugs
but not others. See DUSTER, supra note 183.

186. Such indignation may have fueled Mrs. Atwater in her § 1983 lawsuit.
187. MARVIN E. WOLFGANG ET AL., NATIONAL SURVEY OF CRIME SEVERITY, at v-x (1985).
i88. Sergio Herzog, Does the Ethnicity of Offenders in Crime Scenarios Affect Public Perceptions
of Crime Seriousness? A Randomized Survey Experiment inIsrael, 82 Soc. FORCEs 757, 774 (2003).
i89. See generally PAUL H. RoBINSON & MICHAEL T. CAHILL, LAW WITHOUT JUSTICE: WHYw CRIMINAL
LAw DOESN'T GIVE PEOPLE WHAT THEY DESERVE 138-39 (2006).
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suggestion regarding "penumbral crimes,"'" and is also what actual
legislators have used to "decriminalize" possession of small amounts of
marijuana. 91 It should be kept in mind, however, that the acceptable
degree of deviation for which enforcement seems inequitable may
change from time to time.'92 Other questions impacting enforcement
discretion include the existence of a victim'" and the potential for certain
infractions to yield evidence of other, more severe infractions, as
opposed to being mere pretexts for targeting more severe, albeit
unproved,suspicions. 94
The challenge in introducing these considerations has to do with the
Court's notorious rejection of empirical facts regarding public opinion.
The Court's untested assumptions of what the public considers a proper
exercise of police discretion are often wrong." However, blatant
inequality does in certain instances generate public outcry, leading to
decreased enforcement and, eventually, legalization. Examples of this
include sexual behavior between consenting same-sex adults in the
United States'96 and earlier in the United Kingdom." In such cases, the
disproportion between the intensity of enforcement (and the resources
generated to support it) and the conduct addressed is blatantly
inequitable.
2. Public Familiarity with Enforcement Standards
Much of our notion of fairness in the criminal justice context stems
from the legality principle: we feel it inherently unfair to be punished for

190. See Raymond, supra note 5, at 1436-38. Raymond sees the solution to the penumbral crime
problem in legislation that prohibits certain "ranges" of infraction, rather than in judicial review of
police power. See id. at 1437.
191. Robert J. MacCoun et al., Do Citizens Know Whether Their State Has Decriminalized
Marijuana? Assessing the Perceptual Component of Deterrence Theory 5 (Goldman Sch. Pub. Pol'y,

Working Paper No. GSPPo8-olil, 2oo8). The decriminalization distinguishes between different types of
drug offenses; one could envision distinctions based on type of drug and amount.
192. This fundamental understanding is the basis for Durkheim's functionalist theory, as well as for
labeling theory in criminology. See HowARD S. BECKER, OUTSIDERS 184 (1963); EMILE DURKHEIM, THE
DIvISIoN OF LABOR IN SoCIETY 265 (1899).
193. Note the problematic notion of the concept of victimless crime. See Roach, supra note 26, at
68o.
194. See MACCOUN & REUTER, supra note 184, for further elaboration on this distinction. One such
example might be different kinds of drugs. Absent additional circumstances, such as early and heavy
use, marijuana abuse is not, in itself, a predictor of future abuse of more addictive and dangerous
drugs. Michael T. Lynskey et al., Escalation of Drug Use in Early-Onset Cannibis Users vs Co-twin
Controls, 289 JAMA 427, 432 (2003). Therefore, it seems that stops and arrests for marijuana

possession cannot be justified on the basis that marijuana abuse might generate more serious drug
activity.
195. See e.g., Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the
Perilsof Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 903-04 (2009).
196. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 569-70 (2003).
197. See THE WOLFENDEN REPORT: REPORT OF THE COMMITEE ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND
PRosTITUTnoN 43 (1963) [hereinafter WOLFENDEN REPORT].
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a behavior that was not a criminal offense at the time we engaged in it. 95
If the public is familiar with law enforcement policies, certain
expectations arise as to the probability of being stopped, searched, or
arrested. The question is to what extent should we respect these
expectations. It seems that the more universal and embedded the
knowledge of the no-enforcement zone is, the more we should hold the
enforcement agency accountable to it. It is very problematic to allow
legislators and enforcers to speak in different voices and then expect the
public to rely on one and ignore the other.'99
One possible argument might be that while the public is expected to
know the law (and legally presumed to know it2"), it is not expected to be
familiar with enforcement policies. However, there is substantial
empirical evidence that undermines such expectations. Survey-based
studies have found that the public is unfamiliar with formal law,20 '
particularly if it is not heavily publicized.202 However, it is reasonable to
assume that the public might be more familiar with enforcement policy,
which in many cases is more visible than the law on the books and has a
much more direct impact on citizens' lives.
The assumption that people are familiar with enforcement standards
is particularly strong in situations in which the police rely on written
regulations and enforcement has otherwise been consistent. In these
cases, arbitrary deviation from usual enforcement standards is more
surprising, and it may shake the trust citizens have in the police and in
government in general.
3. Proportionalityof Police Response
In some cases, a minor infraction and a history of underenforcement
may in themselves amount to inequitability.2 o4 However, in other cases, it
would also be useful to examine the proportionality of police response
and to deem it inequitable if it exceeds common sense under the
198. This is one of the cornerstones of criminal law, established by Enlightenment-era literature.
See CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 29 (Adolph Caso ed., Int'l Pocket Library 4th ed.

1983) (1764).
199. There are other examples in criminal justice in which the Court has refused to recognize more
than one voice for the government. See, e.g., Whiteley v. Warden, Wyo. State Penitentiary, 401 U.S.
56o, 568 (1971). Recently, however, in Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695,704 (2009), the Supreme

Court was willing to exempt police officers from responsibility for a mistake made by other officers.
200. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04 (1985).

201. For one empirically tested example, see Peter Bowal, A Study of Lay Knowledge of Law in
Canada, 9 IND. INT'L & COMp. L. REV. 121, 136 (1998).

202. In their study on marijuana decriminalization, Robert J. MacCoun and his coauthors pointed
out that the original decriminalizing statutes were heavily publicized, and therefore, the public was

familiar with them; however, currently, people are largely unaware that their state has decriminalized
marijuana. See MacCoun et al., supra note 101. at356.
203. See SKOGAN & FRYDL, supra note 6, at 3oo-o1.

204. Think, for example, of a traffic citation for driving one mile over the speed limit in a rural
area where no one has ever been issued a citation.
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circumstances. In Atwater, the petitioner was arrested for not wearing a
seatbelt while her children were in the car.' Some evidence referred to
in the decision suggests that the arrest was the result of an altercation
between Atwater and the police officer." In this way, it would be
important to find out whether police action resulted from a minor
incident, following which the interaction between the officer and the
citizen escalated into a full-blown conflict. In those situations, the arrest
may be taken out of proportion, and may reflect the police officer's
frustration with a situation that would not have arisen but for the initial
stop." Finally, another consideration may be the animus surrounding the
enforcement event. Enforcement may be deemed inequitable when it is
accompanied by threats, epithets, or other destructive expressions or
behaviors on the part of the police."
4. Citizen-Related Circumstances
As mentioned in the Introduction, the concept of equity, while not
limited to issues of equality, certainly encompasses a commitment to
equality.2 9 And, as mentioned above, one of the areas in which the police
are most often critiqued is inattentiveness to racial inequality.2 0 We have
also seen that the Supreme Court has hesitated to outlaw racial
profiling.2"' Various jurisdictions have seen it as problematic and have
created legislation that abolishes it as a practice." However, there are
some issues pertaining to the citizen's identity that merit further
reflection. One example is the extent to which a different level of
enforcement is justified against citizens with a criminal record. The
Supreme Court has supported this practice, going so far as to relax the
level of suspicion required to search parolees.2 " This approach raises two
problems. First, there is the concern that tougher enforcement policies
toward citizens with a criminal history could be perceived as punishment
for previous transgressions.2 I4 The second problem pertains to the
connection between a citizen's criminal record and other demographic
features. Given the data on overenforcement against minorities, some
532 U.S. 338, 323-24 (200).
2o6. See id. at 324. The officer in Atwater is quoted to have said "we've met before." Id.
207. When looking at these situations, one must be cognizant of the role ethnicity and culture can
205.

play in the perceived opposition to the officer. See Epp et al., supra note 173. See generally, BECKER,
supra note 192, at 184.
208. This becomes more important in Part IV, in which we discuss Tom Tyler's work.
209. See Shanske, supra note i.
210. See SKOGAN & FRYDL, supra note 6, at 30.
213. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 8o6, 813 (1996).
212. See supra Part II.A.3.
213. See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 857 (2oo6).
234. This is,
admittedly, a rather naive argument; the current sentencing system has a variety of

features, such as parole violations and three-strikes laws, inwhich one's criminal history certainly leads
to a more aggressive fate interms of sentencing. It should be kept in mind, however, that this Article
tackles police enforcement, which is not even to be regarded as punishment.
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criminologists have suggested that enforcement policies might use
criminal record as a proxy for belonging to a minority group.' This
prospect again raises problems regarding equal protection litigation.

B.

FOURTH AMENDMENT-BASED INEQUITABILITY

We now turn to examine the feasibility of introducing these factors
into constitutional doctrine using existing constitutional mechanisms.
First, we suggest including the new set of variables as part of a "totality
of the circumstances" analysis. We then move on to suggest that courts
might find inequitable enforcement to be per se unreasonable, or use the
factors as part of a balancing test.
i. Totality of the Circumstances Test and Inequitable Enforcement
To construct a Fourth Amendment argument that addresses
inequitable enforcement, the first solution we propose is to consider any
incident of inequitable enforcement as an additional factor to be
included in the totality of the circumstances determination of
reasonableness. In the Fourth Amendment context, the totality of the
circumstance test is the objective measuring stick for reasonableness.216
This test is not a bright-line rule, but instead a flexible approach that the
Court adopted because of its elasticity in the face of widely varying
situations implicating the Fourth Amendment."' For example, on
different occasions the Court has articulated various permissible
considerations within the totality of the circumstances.21 8 Under this
approach, the fact that a certain offense is penumbral in nature, or the
location of the particular conduct within the penumbra, would also be
considered for the totality of the circumstances test.
Inequitable Enforcement Is Per Se Unreasonable
2.
The second option is to define inequitable enforcement as per se
unreasonable, thereby removing the battle from Fourth Amendment
grounds, and instead determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether
particular police activity is inequitable. This would be accomplished
through an evidentiary or pretrial motion hearing (like a Murgia2t 9 or
Pitchess 20 motion). The attraction of this approach is simplicity: it would

215. Barbara Hudson, Diversity, Crime, and Criminal Justice, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
158, 161-63 (Mike Maguire et al. eds., 2007).
216. See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33,39 (1996)

CRIMINOLOGY

217. See id.

218. See, for example, the role of veracity and basis of knowledge in establishing probable cause
after Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983).

219. This is a motion to dismiss criminal charges based on a showing of selective prosecution for
improper purposes, which amounts to an equal protection violation. See Murgia v. Mun. Court, 540
P.2d 44, 48 (Cal. 1975).
220. This is a motion to discover complaints made by other people against the law enforcement
officer involved in the defendant's case, in order to show a pattern of aggressive behavior by the
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take just a single holding by the Court that inequitable enforcement that
leads to arrest or search renders that arrest or search unreasonable. Trial
court judges currently make similar judgments at pretrial suppression
hearings, where they are tasked with fact-centric disputes about police
behavior.22 '
3. Balancing Test
The third possible solution is for the courts to balance the interests
of the state against those of the individual, using formulas already
created by the Court in other contexts. Thus far, balancing tests have
been reserved for searches conducted without probable cause, namely
administrative searches222 and other special needs searches.22 In each of
these scenarios, the Court has approved warrantless, suspiciounless
searches only because the governmental interests were so great, and
privacy interests comparatively minimal.22 4 The advantage of adopting
such a test in the inequitable enforcement context is flexibility: in the
situations in which police behavior is more egregious, there will be more
protection, and vice versa. The disadvantage is practicality: unlike the
per se approach discussed above, this does not provide lower courts with
anything close to a bright-line rule. Lower courts would have to
determine, on a case-by-case basis, not only how bad the police conduct
was, but also how great the governmental interests served by the conduct
was.
A possible hurdle for this proposal is probable cause: the Court has
expressly declined to use balancing tests where the stop or search was
made pursuant to probable cause."' However, the Court's ruling in
Delaware v. Prouse generates some support for a balancing test of
reasonability.2 , In Prouse, the Court found that the challenged law gave
so much discretion to police officers (who were making suspicionless,
random stops to check licenses and registrations) as to make the
resulting stops unreasonable."' The same problem is present in the case
of stops for minor traffic offenses. As defense counsel argued in Whren,

officer. See Pitchess v. Superior Court, 522 P.2d 305, 308 (Cal. 1974).
221. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 653 (1961) (reasonableness of police search is for trial
court to determine); Burris v. United States, 192 F.2d 253, 254 (5th Cir. 1951).
222.
223.

See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985).
See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 6o6, 616 (1977).

See Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444,455 (1990).
Virginia v. Moore, 128 S. Ct. 1598, 1604 (2009) ("In a long line of cases, we have said that
when an officer has probable cause to believe a person committed even a minor crime in his presence,
the balancing of private and public interests is not in doubt. The arrest is constitutionally
reasonable.").
226. See 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
227. Id. at 663.
224.
225.
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the current traffic enforcement regime gives police officers just as much
discretion as the Court found objectionable in Prouse.2

C.

ALTERING EQUAL PROTECTION DOCTRINE To DETECT INEQUITABILITY

We are less hopeful as to the potential of addressing inequitable

enforcement through the Equal Protection Clause. As discussed above,
the historical approach of the Court has been overly narrow in
identifying and addressing this type of discrimination. We argue that it
has been overly narrow in insisting on determining the existence of a
group before vindicating the right for the individual. However, equal
protection of the laws does not implicitly require equal protection of the
laws for each group. Nothing in the words of the Fourteenth Amendment
limits the availability of relief to groups. Lawrence and other critics of
the Davis opinion point out the shortcomings in the Court's approach to
finding equal protection violations; their solutions focus on encouraging
the Court to take a broader view of the clause -and a more realistic view
of the state of society.' The inequitable enforcement problem is,
therefore, one more reason for the Court to move beyond classes of
people and find equal protection violations on an individual level.
Another challenge to defendants wishing to use Equal Protection to
address inequitable enforcement is the issue of remedy. Unlike the
Fourth Amendment, there is no exclusionary remedy for Fourteenth
Amendment violations, and any civil remedies would likely mean little to
an incarcerated person.o In the rare instances in which criminal
defendants have raised successful equal protection claims, the remedy
has been dismissal of the case. In Batson, though technically the remedy
was a remand, the rule established for future cases requires dismissal.'
In United States v. Armstrong, an unsuccessful attempt to demonstrate
discriminatory prosecution, the defendant sought dismissal as an
appropriate remedy."' However, it would not be practically necessary for
most defendants to have both dismissal and suppression of evidence as
remedies at their disposal, as long as one of the two is available.
228. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note
229. See discussion supra Part II.B.i.

126, at 10.

230. See Davis, supra note 145, at 436. Davis identifies a further problem-that of the difficulty of
a convicted criminal winning a jury verdict against the police department responsible for taking him or
her off the street. Id.
231. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 100 (1986).
Because the trial court flatly rejected the objection without requiring the prosecutor to give
an explanation for his action, we remand this case for further proceedings. If the trial court
decides that the facts establish, prima facie, purposeful discrimination and the prosecutor
does not come forward with a neutral explanation for his action, our precedents require that
petitioner's conviction be reversed.
Id.
232.

557 U.S. 456, 459 (5996).
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Suppression of evidence uncovered through an unlawful search usually
has the practical effect of dismissal since, without that evidence, there is
rarely much more to the prosecution's case.

IV.

NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS

Changes in Fourth Amendment doctrine, such as making it more
inclusive of issues of disproportion, arbitrariness, and demeanor, may in
turn generate change in police regulations, police activities in the field,
and citizen behavior. This concluding Part examines some potential
implications, which assume that police culture is, indeed, responsive to
legal decisions.3

A.

FLEXIBILITY

One possible source of resistance to the multifactor test could be the
Court's preference for simpler rules and guidelines for police and lower
courts. The rationale would be that a multifactor approach does not
provide police officers in the field with a comprehensive "how-to" guide
to their interactions with citizens.2 34 While these considerations should
not be discounted, it is important to keep in mind that the existing
standard of suspicion relies on balancing amounts of information and
weighing considerations.' Proportionality can be coded into internal
regulations just like level of suspicion. The Court did not hesitate to
move toward these substantive and nonformalistic tests and away from
the warrant requirement.236 Relying on police discretion and good
judgment should be a two-way street: if we place upon the police's
shoulders the duty to correctly calibrate the amount of suspicion, there is
no reason to believe that they will do a poorer job calibrating the
proportional relationship between the offense, the offender's demeanor,
and the optimal enforcement reaction.
B.

FORESEEABILITY, DETERRENCE, AND ELASTICITY

Under an equitability review system, the police will be required to
adhere to commonly held expectations about enforcement based on

233. Some argue that the police are held to higher standards of accountability beyond those
imposed by Supreme Court constitutional decisions. See, e.g., Samuel Walker, Beyond the Supreme
Court: Alternative Paths to the Control of Police Behavior, 14 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 189 (1990); see also
SKOGAN & FRYDL, supra note 6, at ioo.
234. This argument has been particularly pertinent to cases in which the police rely on the -good
faith" exception to the exclusionary rule, see Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 701 (2oo9), and
was also a substantial part of the decision in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 27 (1967).
235. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213. 233 (1983).
236. In Gates, for example, the Supreme Court moved away from the formalities required in
previous cases for establishing suspicion. Id.; see also, e.gj, Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 415
(1969)-
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regulations. Foreseeability is, in general, a positive outcome, which will
clarify enforcement policies to minimize vagueness." However, it raises
the concern that a more lenient enforcement policy will create a decline
in deterrence. Some studies suggest that the "law in the books" has
symbolic value and offers deterrent effects regardless of the level of
enforcement."' A potential decline in deterrence is a legitimate concern.
Nevertheless, it is important to remember that a sanction's severity is
only one variable that predicts deterrence. Experimental behavioral
studies have consistently found certainty of enforcement-or risk of
apprehension-to be a more reliable determinant of deterrence than the
expected severity of punishment.2 39 One criticism of tailoring
enforcement to meet citizen expectations focuses on a potential decline
in deterrence, seeing as deterrence is supposedly a function of severity.2 40
However, deterrence is also a function of certainty, and when people
assess that their chances of getting caught are slim, deterrence does not
work very well,2 4' which means that practical expectations probably play
more into this than black letter law anyway.
Another possible concern is that if potential offenders are better
able to predict their chances of being searched and detained, the element
of surprise in police activity is greatly diminished and criminal activity
will change to avoid police encounters. These risks depend on the
elasticity of crime and the quality of policing. Ideally, a review of
equitability will take into account realistic police concerns when
examining the proportion of police reaction. That means that any
increase in criminal activity in response to heightened foreseeability will
manifest itself in an increase in penumbral crimes, which are not a grave
concern anyway. Also, while the intrusiveness of policing may diminish,
there is no reason to assume that police enforcement will decrease in
terms of its geographical reach or in terms of the quality of information
obtained. We think, therefore, that the benefits of foreseeability exceed
the risks of elastic criminal behavior.

237. "The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that penal statutes define crimes so that ordinary
people can understand the conduct prohibited and so that arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is
not encouraged." United States v. McLamb, 985 F.2d 1284, 1291 (4th Cir. 1993).
238. One such study is Patricia Funk's study of voting patterns in Sweden. See Patricia Funk, Is
There an Expressive Function of Law? An EmpiricalAnalysis of Voting Laws with Symbolic Fines, 9
AM. L. & EcoN. REV. 135 (2007). Funk found that, after the legal duty to vote during the elections was
canceled, voter percentages declined, despite the fact that the law had been underenforced for many
years; Funk concludes that deterrence stemmed from the law's symbolic value. Id.
239. See, e.g., Edmund S. Howe & Thomas C. Loftus, Integration of Certainty, Severity, and
Celerity Information in Judged Deterrence Value: Further Evidence and Methodological Equivalence,
26 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 226, 238-39 ('996).
240. Harold 0. Gramsick & Robert J. Bursik, Conscience, Significant Others, and Rational
Choices: Extending the Deterrence Model, 24 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 837, 839-40 (3990).
248. Id.at 840.
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SLIPPERY SLOPE OF LENIENCY

One possible concern about the idea of equitable enforcement is
related to the relationship between formal criminal law and enforcement
policies: if the police show more commitment to the "buffer zones" of
criminal prohibition and refrain from enforcing penumbral crimes,
formal law will gradually morph and decriminalize penumbral crimes.4
As the reach of criminal law narrows, more and more crimes will move
into the "buffer zones" of law, which will lead to a slippery slope of
decriminalization.
This concern about a slippery slope of leniency can be addressed in
several ways. First, an examination of punitive tendencies in the United
States strongly suggests that a slide toward leniency is not a realistic
concern. In fact, studies following the punitiveness of criminalization and
enforcement policies consistently demonstrate that, since the late 1970s,
definitions of crimes have broadened and sentences that result from
convictions have increased.243 Moreover, several studies suggest that this
increase in punitiveness is not supported by public opinion, but is rather
initiated by politicians in response to perceived threats)" despite a
decline in reported crime.245 Given the tendency of the enforcement
universe to expand rather than contract,246 a shift toward contraction
seems unrealistic.
Second, concerns about changes in the scope of formal law in
response to informal policies assume a great level of responsiveness on
the part of state politicians to enforcement practices that may be initiated
and applied at the city level, and sometimes at the neighborhood level.
Much police practice involves deep acquaintance with urban conditions
and neighborhood populations. It is therefore unlikely that formal law, at
the state level, will be tailored to address local needs.
Third, even if conforming to the requirements of equitable
enforcement may eventually lead to a narrowing of the scope of formal
242. This concern stems from historical examples in which underenforcement, or difficulty in
enforcement, was an important factor in subsequent decriminalization or legalization. One example is
the Wolfenden Report, which referred to the challenges of enforcing prohibition on sexual acts
between consenting adults as one reason for their legalization. See WOLFENDEN REPORT, supra note
197, at 23, 43.

243. Compare, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 23152(b) (West 1987) (defining unlawful "driving under the
influence" as driving while having a blood alcohol percentage of .xo% or more), with CAL. VEH. CODE
§ 23152(b) (West 2008) (defining the same crime as driving while having a blood alcohol percentage of
.o8% or more). For further information, see SENTENCING REFORM IN OVERCROWDED TIMES 249

(Michael Tonry & Kathleen Hatlestad eds., 1997).
244. See, e.g., JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME 22 (2007).
245. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE GREAT AMERICAN CRIME DECLINE I (2007); Douglas Thompson

& Anthony Ragona, PopularModeration Versus Governmental Authoritarianism,33 CRIME & DELINQ.
337,351I(1987).
246. STANLEY
(1985).

COHEN, VISIoNS

OF SOCIAL

CONTROL: CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND CLASSIFICATION

49-56
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law to match underenforcement policies, this is not necessarily an
undesirable outcome. 47 When given the choice between rigid and harsh,
albeit often unenforced laws and a more lenient set of laws that is
consistently enforced, considerations of foreseeability and justice may
lead us to prefer the latter setting over the former.

D.

TRANSPARENCY

Another issue with legalizing equitability might be the concern
about a decline in transparency. Since, under a review of equitability, one
of the factors will be the police's adherence to their declared policies,
such policies may gradually become less available to the public, so as not
to bind the police to their regulations. Such developments might defeat
the purpose of a broad review of police work; rather than regulating
arbitrariness, a broad regulation would generate "avoidance techniques"
on the part of the police, which would actually increase arbitrariness.
These concerns would be graver were the police not a bureaucratic
organization, relying on regulation and procedures for its daily
operations. 8 Given the need for these regulations, it does not seem
likely that holding police officers accountable to regulations would
decrease reliance upon regulations.

E.

FAIRNESS

An insistence on police adherence to a sense of proportion will have
an additional long-term benefit for police activities: namely, generating a
public sentiment that police enforcement is fair. Empirical research by
behavioral scientists has found increasing evidence of the importance of
fairness to public-police relations. Tom Tyler's classic book, Why People
Obey the Law, suggests that, based on surveys, the level of public
compliance rises in cases in which there is perceived fairness. 4 9
Moreover, the book, and other works by Tyler and collaborators,
emphasize the important role of procedural justice.2 0 When people
thought they were treated fairly, the level of legitimacy they ascribed to
the law and their motivation for compliance and cooperation rose,
regardless of the actual outcome of their cases.'" Most recently, Tyler
and Jeffrey Fagan examined variables that led people to cooperate with
2

247. The Wolfenden Report is a good illustration of this argument. See WOLFENDEN REPORT, supra
note 197, at 79.

248. For the police's reliance on regulations, see SKOGAN & FRYDL, supra note 6, at 184, and
Walker, supra note 233.
249. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 16142 (1990).

250. See id. at 1o5; Jason Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler, The Role of ProceduralJustice and Legitimacy
in Shaping PublicSupport for Policing, 37 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 553 (2003).
251. Tom R. TYLER & E. ALLAN LIND, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 64 ('988);
Tom R. TYLER ET AL., SOCIAL JUSTICE IN A DIVERSE SOCmnT 85-86 (1998).
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the police. 52 The most important considerations, by far, had to do with
the quality of the encounter.2 " People who felt they were treated fairly
and politely expressed more faith in the police and more willingness to
assist the police in the future-regardless of the outcome of their
interaction with the police.2 54
These findings imply that a commitment to equitable enforcement
may yield long-term benefits to the police. Such a conclusion may be
counterintuitive from a law and order perspective, which would support
harsher policies for the purpose of deterrence.' They also imply that the
distinction between effective law enforcement and constitutional rights
may be a false one, and that a classic mechanism of Packer's due process
model-more constraints on police discretion256-might ultimately make
the police more effective and therefore promote crime control for the
long term.
A final word pertains to the impact of the financial crisis on policing.
In lean years, the criminal justice system will find a variety of ways to
scale back costs and expenses associated with law enforcement.' One
way of doing so is to focus law enforcement on areas that yield the
largest increase in public safety. While increasing an arrest quota in
hopes of catching serious crime through pretextual tactics is a
measurable achievement in the short-term, long-term considerations may
suggest that the dividends to be reaped from fairness are more
impressive. Fairness, in the long run, will increase compliance and,
therefore, public safety.
CONCLUSION

Our analysis suggests that the current parameters for assessing
police discretion fail to capture important dimensions that would
encourage sound common sense and a proper understanding of
enforcement priorities. As argued above, the dearth of effective tools for
review is not due to narrow constitutional language, but its narrow
interpretation by the Supreme Court, which has rejected several relevant
considerations. The problem of inequitable enforcement extends beyond
issues of suspicion and blatant racial inequalities to include a rich set of
problematic situations.

252. Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do People Help the Police
Fight Crime in Their Communities?, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 231J, 250 (2oo8).
253. Id. at 264.
254. Id. at 267.
255. See GEORGE L. KELLING & CATHERINE COLES, FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS: RESTORING ORDER
AND REDUCING

CRIME

IN OUR COMMUNITIES 257 (1996).

256. See PACKER, supra note 3.
257. See Hadar Aviram, Humonetarianism: The New Correctional Discourse of Scarctry. 7
HASTINGs RACE & POVERTY L.J. I (2009).
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We believe that law enforcement will benefit, in the long run, from
generating a sense of fairness. Such sentiments would be fostered if the
assessment of police behavior is expanded to include the characteristics
of the infraction, public familiarity with enforcement standards, and the
proportionality of police response. Even if changes in constitutional
analysis to encompass our multivariate suggestion are unrealistic in the
current Supreme Court, they are offered to our readers as a reminder of
the boundaries of law, and of the limited ability to understand the
interaction between the police and the community based on suspicion
alone.
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